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Feb.1954] RECORD FJ'l'C. Co. v. PAGEMAN HoLD. CoRP. 227 
[42 C.2d 227; 266 P.2d 1) 
[L .. A .. No. 22601. In Bank. Feb. 11, 1954.] 
RECORD MACHINE & TOOL COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Respondent, v. P AGEMAN HOLDING CORPORA-
TION (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Tender-Time-Before Maturity.-When money is to be paid 
at a specified time, creditor is not required to accept it before 
that time. 
[2] Vendor and Purchaser-Payment of Purchase Money-Time 
of Tender: Patents-Agreements to Transfer.-A contract for 
sale of real property, personal property and patents may 
reasonably be construed to authorize payment of unpaid bal-
ance by buyer before all installments become due where 
contract authorizes payment of $1,000 "or more" on first day 
of every month, and also gives buyer 60 days grace "within 
which" he could cure any late payments. 
[3] Tender-Time-Waiver or EstoppeL-Seller under conditional 
sales contract authorizing payment of $1,000 "or more" on 
first day of every month is in no position to maintain that 
tender of unpaid balance on August 22d to be effective on 
September 5th was faulty because such balance could be paid 
only on first of month, where seller did not mention pre-
maturity of tender in its :;:efusal of tender and waited until 
September 4th before notifying buyer of refusal, thereby de-
priving buyer of opportunity it would have had to change 
effective date of tender had seller acted promptly after 
August 22d notice. 
[4] Vendor and Purchaser-Performance of Contract-Tender: 
Patents-Agreements to Transfer.-Seller under conditional 
sales contract for sale of real property, personal property 
and patents may not successfully object to buyer's ability to 
produce required amount of money on tender of unpaid bal-
ance due on contract, where only real reason for refusal of 
tender was seller's lack of ability to give good title to one 
patent, where bank in which an escrow had been opened was 
ready and willing to make loan to buyer on real property 
and there was no obstacle to sale of personal property, the 
purchase price for which had been deposited in escrow, and 
where conditional sales contract required seller to furnish 
title insurance on property, a proceeding which is customarily 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Tender, § 6; Am.Jur., Tender, § 17. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Tender, § 6; [2] Vendor and 
Purchaser, § 197; Patents, § 4; [4] Vendor and Purchaser, § 153; 
Patents, § 4; [5, 6] Judgments, § 13; [7] Specific Performance, 
§ 144. 
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done an escrow when delivery of the deed and title 
insurance and payment of pnrchase price are to he concurrent. 
[5] buyer's aC·· 
tion for declaration of under conditional sales contract 
for sale of real and trial 
court should 
further where such matters as seller's inability to 
supply good title to one patent would have on amount 
of reduction which should be made in purchase price payable, 
and where an factor in that determination would 
be value of of purchase price allocable 
to patent, as well as has an interest in 
having that determination made and requires that its 
rights be determined. 
[6] court has discre-
tion as to extent of relief to be afforded in a proceeding for 
declaratory but where a case is made for such relief 
the court should not deny it. 
[7] Specific Performance- Relief- Doing Complete Justice.-
Where a contract is specifically enforced the court should do 
complete justice. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Leon T. David, Judge pro tem.* Reversed 
with directions. 
Action for declaratory relief and for damages for breach 
of contract. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser and Arthur ~A,.. Worth for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant from a judgment in an 
action by plaintiff to have declared its rights under a con-
ditional sales contract, in which plaintiff is buyer and de-
fendant seller, to have it determined how much plaintiff still 
owes under the contract, and for damages for breach of the 
contract by defendant. 
According to the findings, and defendant contracted 
in writing for the sale of real property, personal property and 
[6] See Cal.Jur., 10-Yr.Supp, Rev.), Declaratory Relief, 
§ 22 et seq; Declaratory § 71 et seq. 
[7] See Specific Performance, § 144; Am.Jur., Specific 
Performance, § 170 et seq. 
*Assigned by Chahman of .Judicial Council. 
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patents. 'J'he of which 
was on execution of balance was 
to be in installments "or more" interest 
on the first of each month June 1, 1947; 
was to have immediate of the property 
but could not of or remove it; "in the event" plain-
tiff the contract and makes all required payments, 
defendant "shall then but not otherwise" convey the real 
property with title insurance and transfer and sufficient 
title to the personal and patents, defendant to retain 
title ·to the until has performed; risk of 
loss is to rest with plaintiff, and it is to have during the life 
of the contract an exclusive license to use the patents. Time 
is made of the essence of the contract. 
Possession of the was to plaintiff under 
the contract. 'l'he court found that had performed 
as require11 the and was not m default. On 
August 23, 1951, to be carried into effect 5, 1951, 
tendered the then balance of the purchase 
price in the amount of (Defendant questions the 
tender, a matter later Defendant refused the 
tender. Defendant did not own prior to the contract and 
has never owned one of the to be sold under 
the contract. 
On September commenced his action 
setting forth the facts and asking that it be de-
clared that it \Yas not in default under the contract and 
would not be in default by failure to make the payments on 
the purchase until defendant gave good title to all the 
property and that the matter be handled by an escrow to 
hold the purchase money and title papers. It also claimed 
damages in that it had been unable to sell at a profit two lathes 
(part of the property sold under the contract) because the 
contract forbade disposal thereof by plaintiff and defendant 
refused to deliver the documents of title. 
The court found as above and further, that 
pla5ntiff should not be required to run the risk of being in 
rlefault for failure to make the price payments nor 
should it be required to make them without assurance the 
defendant could give good title (such assurance was unlikely 
as defendant did not own one of the patents); that payment 
through escrow was proper to avoid the risk; that defendant 
had been in default under the contract since its inception 
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title to the patents which it did not own; that since the 
refusal of the tender plaintiff was the owner of all the interest 
of defendant in all the property described in the contract; 
that defendant should within 5 days of entry of judgment 
deposit with the clerk instruments transferring all the prop-
erty to plaintiff; that on September 5, 1951, plaintiff owed 
$26,524 under the contract and had since paid $7,640.12, 
leaving a balance of $18,884.21; that it was impossible for 
defendant to give good title to one of the patents because it 
did not own it; that defendant was not entitled to any further 
payments under the contract until it could give good title to 
all the property but plaintiff might make payments to the 
clerk; that under the contract the delivery of the instru-
ments of title transferring good title was to be made con-
currently with the full payment of the purchase price; that 
plaintiff could not recover damages in the action as it was 
one for declaratory relief but might recover same .in another 
action; that to avoid further litigation the trial court might 
order the method of completing performance of the contract 
and retained jurisdiction to do so. 
The judgment declared the foregoing rights and obligations 
and further ordered defendant to deliver to the clerk transfer 
instruments giving plaintiff good title to all the property 
and if it failed to do so the clerk should execute them; that 
they were then to be delivered to plaintiff; that any payments 
made by plaintiff to the clerk (plaintiff was authorized but 
was not required to make them) should be used to pay for 
title insurance and the balance was to be held by the clerk 
until further order of the court; that defendant was '' re-
mitted to an action for the balance due under" the contract 
''as payments become due'' thereunder; that if payments 
were made by plaintiff to the clerk, defendant might obtain 
them upon petition to the court showing it had deposited 
instruments transferring good title to the property; that 
defendant was afforded the opportunity to deliver such good 
title but if it failed to do so, plaintiff had its action for dam-
ages. 
Summarized, it appears that the judgment declares plaintiff 
to be the owner of all defendant's interest in the property 
and defendant must transfer good title thereto. If it cannot 
or does not do so, it must bring an action for the payments 
due under the contract as there provided, presumably taking 
into consideration the amount thereof and the effect of its 
inability or failure to give good title to all the property. 
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Plaintiff may, but is not required to make payments to the 
clerk, and if it does, defendant cannot get them unless it 
produces good title to all the property; any damages claimed 
for breach by defendant must be asserted in another action. 
Defendant appealed, contending (1) That the tender was 
not valid and therefore the effect on the rights of the parties 
given to it by the judgment was erroneous; (2) that the 
court failed to dispose completely of the controversy, as it 
should in an action for declaratory relief, in that it did not 
determine the value of the patent to which defendant could 
not give good title so as to show the amount by which the 
unpaid balance of the purchase price should be reduced. 
·with regard to the tender, it appears that on August 22, 
1951, plaintiff sent a writing to defendant in which it offered 
to pay on September 5, 1951, the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase price stating that it had opened a specified escrow 
for that purpose with a named bank in which it had instructed 
the bank to pay the sum of $26,549.18 to defendant concur-
rently with the bank's receipt from the defendant of instru-
ments transferring good title to the property together with 
certificates of title insurance. It also advised defendant that 
it had a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy part of 
the personal property provided it could obtain title thereto. 
The money was not deposited with the bank but plaintiff had 
two other escrows, one of which was for the sale of some of 
the personal property, the money for which had been de-
posited, and the other was one under which the bank was to 
make plaintiff a loan on the real property to be secured by a 
trust deed thereon and which would require, of course, that 
title be vested in plaintiff. AJl escrow charges were paid by 
plaintiff. Defendant refused to proceed, stating its reasons 
in a letter, dated September 4, 1951, in which it was claimed 
the arrangement did not comply with the sale contract in 
that : (1) The amount was not correct; (2) there was no duty 
on defendant to act through an escrow; (3) payments were 
to be made to defendant by mail at a stated address rather 
than at a bank; ( 4) defendant was not required to deliver 
the transfer instruments and title insurance until a reason-
able time after it had received full payment. The letter con-
cluded by stating that if plaintiff desired to pay the unpaid 
balance through escrow, defendant would give the matter 
consideration. The court found that when defendant sent its 
letter of refusal it could not, and knew it could not, give 
good title to the patent it did not own and that its refusal 
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was based solely on that reason; that the reasons stated in its 
letter were not true to the defendant's knowledge; that the 
tender was made in faith but the refusal was in bad 
faith and that able and willing to perform; 
that an ordinary and incident to the transaction 
of securing title insurance contract called for such in-
surance on the real would be that payment plain-
tiff would be held in until such insurance had been 
procured. 
Defendant now contends that the tender was faulty on 
the ground that under the contract the unpaid balance could 
be paid on the first of the month, the of payment 
of installments on the and not on September 
5th as was offered; that plaintiff did not have the ability to 
pay the balance because it had to be realized from 
the two other escrows above mentioned. 
[1] It has been held that when money is to be paid at a 
specified the creditor is not required to accept it be-
fore that time. v. Fox, 155 Cal. 106 [99 P. 489, 132 
Am.St.Rep. 20 L.R.A.N.S. 338], and Rhorer v. Bila, 83 
Cal. 51 P. 274], that a vendee in a contract for 
the sale of real property calling for payments in installments 
on specified dates cannot put his vendor in default by tender-
ing the entire balance and demanding a deed to the 
property.) however, the trial court reasonably 
construed the contract in the case at bar to authorize pay-
ment of the unpaid balance by before all the install-
ments became due because the contract authorized the pay-
ment of $1,000 "or more" on the first day of every month. 
Thus there is no doubt that amount in excess of $1,000 
·could be and that excess could consist of the entire un-
paid balance. It was that such payment could 
be made at times other than the first of the month as another 
clause of the contract gave plaintiff 60 days grace "within 
which'' he could cure any late payment. Hence any time 
within the 60 days the $1,000 ''or more'' could be paid. 
[3] defendant should not be permitted to main-
tain its position because it was notified of the tender on 
August 22 to be effective on 5th. While it did 
mention the of the tender of all the entire bal-
ance in its refusal of the tender, it waited until September 
4, after the first of the month had passed, before it notified 
plaintiff of its refusal. Plaintiff was not given the oppor-
tunity to change the effective date of its tender to the first of 
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September which it would have been able to do had defendant 
acted promptly after the August 22d notice. 
[4] On the issue of plaintiff's ability to produce the re-
quired amount of money under its tender, several factors 
should be noted. It is conceded that defendant could not 
give good title to the patent at any time and apparently 
never will be able so to do. The court found that the only 
real reason for defendant's refusal of the tender was its lack 
of ability to give good title to the patent. In its rejection 
it specified many technical grounds which indicated that even 
if it had known that the money was to be supplied by the 
loan on the real property and the proceeds of the sale of 
some personal property it would still have rejected the tender. 
The bank was ready and willing to make the loan on the real 
property and there was no obstacle to the sale of the personal 
property. The purchase price had been deposited in escrow 
and it is not important that plaintiff did not prove that notice 
of bulk sale was given. It does not appear that the sale 
would not have been completed. The conditional sale contract 
required defendant to furnish title insurance on the property, 
a proceeding which ordinarily requires time, and is cus-
tomarily done through an escrow when the delivery of the 
deed and title insurance and the payment of the purchase 
price are to be concurrent. The defendant in its letter reject-
ing the tender made no real objection to an escrow as it said 
in the closing paragraph that it would consider such an 
arrangement. For these reasons we do not believe defendant's 
objection to the tender should prevail. 
[5] The trial court failed to find the value of the patent 
to which defendant could not give good title, or, stated in 
another way, the damage plaintiff would suffer by defendant's 
inability to perform the contract in that respect. However, 
it did declare that title to all the property had passed, ordered 
defendant to execute transfer instruments, and permitted, but 
did not require, plaintiff to pay the purchase price. The 
court should have completed the determination of the con-
troversy to avoid further litigation. The inability of defend-
ant to supply good title to the patent, one item of the property 
sold, would have a bearing upon the amount of the reduction 
which should be made in the purchase price payable. An 
important factor in that determination would be the value 
of the patent and the proportion of the purchase price appli-
cable to all of the property allocable to the patent. Defendant, 
as well as plaintiff, has an interest in having that determina-
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tion made as otherwise it has passed title to all the property 
without knowledge of what amount of the balance of the 
purchase price it is entitled to receive. It is true that defend-
ant objected during the proceedings to broadening the scope 
of the determination and the court .declared that defendant's 
action to recover the purchase price as well as plaintiff's 
action for damages were preserved, but because of the scope 
of the judgment with respect to plaintiff's rights in the prop-
erty (it in effect specifically enforces the contract on behalf 
of plaintiff) justice requires that defendant's rights also be 
determined. [6] The trial court has discretion as to the 
extent of the relief to be afforded in a proceeding for declara-
tory relief (5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. [1944 Rev.], Declaratory 
Relief, § 22 et seq.), but where a case is made for such relief 
the court should not deny it. (Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840 
[ 168 P .2d 5].) [7] Where a contract is specifically enforced 
the court should do complete justice. ( 23 Cal.J ur. 509 rt 
seq.) That has not been done here. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed 
to render the same judgment heretofore given, but in addi-
tion, shall ascertain and declare the rights of the parties with 
respect to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase 
price, if any, under the contract, and the effect thereon of 
defendant's inability to give good title to the patent it does 
not own. Each party shall bear his own costs of this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
